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Abstract
White, non-college-educated Americans born in the 1960s face shorter life
expectancies, higher medical expenses, and lower wages per unit of human
capital compared with those born in the 1940s, and men’s wages declined more
than women’s. After documenting these changes, we use a life-cycle model
of couples and singles to evaluate their effects. The drop in wages depressed
the labor supply of men and increased that of women, especially in married
couples. Their shorter life expectancy reduced their retirement savings, but the
increase in out-of-pocket medical expenses increased them by more. Welfare
losses, measured as a onetime asset compensation, are 12.5%, 8%, and 7.2%
of the present discounted value of earnings for single men, couples, and single
women, respectively. Lower wages explain 47%-58% of these losses, shorter life
expectancies 25%-34%, and higher medical expenses account for the rest.
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1 Introduction
Much of macroeconomics studies policies having to do with either business cycle
fluctuations or growth. Business cycle fluctuations are typically short-lived, do not
affect a cohort’s entire life cycle, and tend to have smaller welfare effects. Growth,
however, drastically improves the outcomes and welfare of successive cohorts over
their entire lives compared to previous cohorts. Yet, recent evidence indicates that
while we are still experiencing growth at the aggregate level, many people in recent
cohorts are worse off, rather than benefiting from aggregate growth. It is important to
study and better understand these cohort-level shocks and their consequences before
trying to evaluate to what extent current government policies attenuate these kinds
of shocks and whether we should redesign some policies to reduce their impacts.
Recent research suggests that understanding these cohort-level shocks and their
consequences is an important question. Guvenen et al. (2017) find that the median
lifetime income of men born in the 1960s is 12%-19% lower than that of men born
in the 1940s, while Roys and Taber (2017) document that the wages of low-skilled
men have stagnated over a similar time period. Hall and Jones (2007) highlight that
the share of medical expenses to consumption has approximately doubled every 25
years since the 1950s, and Case and Deaton (2015, 2017) have started an important
debate by showing that the mortality rate of white, less-educated, middle-aged men
has been increasing since 1999. In contrast with men’s, the median lifetime income
of women born in the 1960s is 22%-33% higher than that of women born in the 1940s
(Guvenen et al. 2017). The latter change, however, occurred in conjunction with
much increased participation of women in the labor market.
While very suggestive, the changes in lifetime income tell us little about what
happened to wages. In addition, depending on how wages, medical expenses, and
mortality changed for married and single men and women, they can have weaker or
stronger effects on couples, single men, and single women. Given the size of these
changes and the large number of people that they affect, more investigation of their
consequences is warranted.
The goal of this paper is to better measure these important changes in the lifetime
opportunities of white, single and married, less-educated American men and women
and to uncover their effects on the labor supply, savings, and welfare of a relatively
recent birth cohort. To do so, we start by picking two cohorts of white, non-college-
2
educated Americans for whom we have excellent data,1 those born in the 1940s and
those born in the 1960s, and by using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to uncover several new facts.
First, we find that, across these two cohorts, men’s average wages have decreased
in real terms by 9% while women’s average wages have increased by 7%, but that
the increase in wages for women is due to higher human capital of women in the
1960s cohort rather than to higher wages per unit of human capital.2 Second, we
document a large increase in out-of-pocket medical expenses later in life: average
out-of-pocket medical expenses after age 66 are expected to increase across cohorts
by 82%. Third, we show that in middle age, the life expectancy of both female and
male white, non-college-educated people is projected to go down by about 2 years
from the 1940s to the 1960s cohort. All of these changes are thus large and have the
potential to substantially affect behavior and welfare.
We then calibrate a life-cycle model of couples and singles to match the labor
market outcomes for the 1960s cohort. Our calibrated model is a version of the
life-cycle model developed by Borella et al. (2017),3 which, in turn, builds on the
literature on female labor supply (including Eckstein and Liftshitz (2011), Blundell
et al. (2016a), Blundell et al (2016b), Fernandez and Wong (2014, 2017), Borella et
al. (2018b), and Eckstein et al. (2019)). Our model is well suited for our purposes
for two important reasons. First, it is a quantitative model that includes single
and married people (with single people meeting partners and married people risking
divorce), which matters because most people are in couples. Second, it allows for
human capital accumulation on the job, which our findings indicate is important,
and includes medical expenses and life-span risk during retirement.
Our calibrated model matches key observed outcomes for the 1960s cohort very
well. To evaluate the effects of the observed changes that we consider, we give the
wage schedules, medical expenses, and life expectancy of the 1940s cohort to our
1960s cohort, starting at age 25, and then study the effects of these changes on the
1960s cohort’s labor supply, savings, and welfare.
1Because the finding of lower life expectancy is confined to less-educated whites, we focus on this
group, and to have a sample size that is large enough, we focus on non-college graduates.
2We measure human capital at a given age as average past earnings at that age (thus, our measure
of human capital incorporates the effects of both years of schooling and work experience).
3Borella et al. (2017) develop and estimate this model to study the effects of marriage-based
income taxes and Social Security benefits on the whole population, regardless of education.
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We find that, of the three changes that we consider (the observed changes in
the wage schedule, an increase in expected out-of-pocket medical expenses during
retirement, and a decrease in life expectancy), the change in the wage schedule had
by far the largest effect on the labor supply of both men and women. In particular,
it depressed the labor supply of men and increased that of women. The decrease
in life expectancy mainly reduced retirement savings, but the expected increase in
out-of-pocket medical expenses increased them by more.
We also find that the welfare costs of these changes are large. Specifically, the one-
time asset compensation required at age 25 to make the 1960s households indifferent
between the 1940s and 1960s health and survival dynamics, medical expenses, and
wages, expressed as a fraction of their average discounted present value of earnings,
are 12.5, 8.0, and 7.2%, for single men, couples, and single women, respectively.4 The
costs are thus largest for single men and smallest for single women. Looking into the
sources of these costs, we find that 47%-58% of them are due to changes in the wage
structure, 25%-34% are due to changing life expectancy, and that medical expenses
explain the remaining losses.
Our results thus indicate that the group of white, non-college-educated people
born in the 1960s cohort, which comprises about 60% of the population of the same
age, experienced large negative changes in wages, large increases in medical expenses,
and large decreases in life expectancy and would have been much better off if they
had faced the corresponding lifetime opportunities of the 1940s birth cohort.
Our paper contributes to the previous literature along several important dimen-
sions. First, it uncovers new facts on wages (and wages per unit of human capital),
expected medical expenses during retirement, and life expectancy in middle age, for
white, non-college-educated American men and women born in the 1940s and 1960s.
Second, it recognizes that most people are not single, isolated individuals, but rather
part of a couple and that changes in lifetime opportunities for one member of the
couple could be either reinforced or weakened by the changes faced by their part-
ner. Third, it documents these changes and introduces them in a carefully calibrated
model that matches the lifetime outcomes of the 1960s cohort well. Fourth, it studies
the effects of these changes in opportunities over time on the savings, labor market
outcomes, and welfare of this cohort.
4These computations are performed for each household one at a time, keeping fixed the assets of
their potential future partners in our benchmark.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our sample selection and
the main characteristics of our resulting sample. Section 3 documents the changing
opportunities for the 1940s and 1960s cohorts in terms of wages, medical expenses,
and life expectancy. Section 4 describes the outcomes for our 1960s cohort in terms
of labor market participation, hours worked by the workers, and savings. Section 5
discusses our structural model and thus the assumptions that we make to interpret
the data. Section 6 explains our empirical strategy and documents the processes that
we estimate as inputs of our structural model, including our estimated wages as a
function of human capital and our estimated medical expenses and mortality as a
function of age, gender, health, and marital status. Section 7 describes our results
and Section 8 concludes.
2 The data and our sample
We use the PSID and the HRS to construct a sample of white, non-college-
educated Americans. We pick the cohort born in the 1940s (which is composed of
the 1936-1945 birth cohorts) as our comparison older cohort because it is the oldest
cohort for which we have excellent data over most of their life cycle (first covered in
the PSID and then in the HRS). We then pick our more recent cohort, the 1960s one
(which is composed of the 1956-1965 birth cohorts), to be as young as possible, con-
ditional on having available data on most of their working period, which we require
our structural model to match. We then compare the lifetime opportunities between
these two cohorts. Online Appendix A reports more details about the data and our
computations.
To be explicit about the population that we are studying, we now turn to dis-
cussing our sampling choices for these cohorts and the resulting composition of our
sample in terms of marital status and education level. We focus on non-college grad-
uates for two reasons. First, we want to focus on less-educated people, but we need
a reasonable number of observations over the life cycle for both single and married
men and women. Second, college graduates (and above) is the only group for which
Case and Deaton (2017) find continued decreases in middle-age mortality over time.
Table 1 displays sample sizes before and after we apply our selection criteria.
We start from 30,587 people and 893,420 observations. We keep household heads
and their spouses, if present, and restrict the sample to the cohorts born between
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Selection Individuals Observations
Initial sample (observed at least twice) 30,587 893,420
Heads and spouses (if present) 18,304 247,203
Born between 1935 and 1965 7,913 137,427
Age between 20 and 70 7,847 135,117
White 6,834 116,810
Non-missing education 6,775 116,619
Non-college graduates 5,039 73,944
Table 1: PSID sample selection
1935 and 1965, to whites, and to include observations reporting their education. Our
sample before performing the education screens comprises 6,775 people and 116,619
observations. Dropping all college graduates and those married with college graduates
results in a sample of 5,039 people and 73,944 observations.5
Turning to our resulting PSID sample, at age 25, 90% and 77% of people in the
1940s and 1960s birth cohorts are married, respectively. To understand how education
changed within our sample of interest, Table 2 reports the education distribution at
age 25 for our non-college graduates in the 1940s and 1960s cohorts. It shows that the
fraction of people without a high school diploma decreased by 40% for men and 43%
for women from the 1940s to the 1960s cohort. Our model and empirical strategy
takes into account education composition within our sample because they control for
people’s human capital, both at labor market entry and over the life cycle.
Men Women
1940 1960 1940 1960
Less than HS 0.29 0.17 0.23 0.13
HS 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.39
More than HS 0.39 0.50 0.40 0.48
Table 2: Fractions of individuals by education level in our two birth cohorts
One might worry about a different type of selection, that is, the one coming from
the fact that we drop people who completed college from our sample for all of our
5Thus, we also drop people with less than 16 years of education but married to someone with 16
or more years of education. Before making this selection, non-graduate husbands with a graduate
wife were 5% of the sample, while non-graduate wives with a graduate husband were 9.7% of the
sample.
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cohorts. If college completion rates were rising fast between the 1940s and 1960s, with
the most able going into college, our 1960s cohort might be much more negatively
selected than our 1940s cohort. Table 12 in Online Appendix D shows that, in the
PSID, the fraction of the population having less than a college degree dropped from
83.1% in the 1940s to 77.2% in the 1960s. This corresponds to a 5.9 percentage
points drop in non-college graduates in the population across our two cohorts (5.6
and 6.7 percentage points for men and women, respectively). Online Appendix D
also compares the implications of our PSID and HRS samples for our model inputs
with those of the corresponding samples in which we keep a constant fraction of the
population for both cohorts. All of these comparisons show that our model inputs
are very similar for both types of samples and that our results are thus not driven by
selection out of our sample.
Because the HRS contains a large number of observations and high-quality data
after age 50, we use it to compute our inputs for the retirement period. The last
available HRS wave is for 2014, which implies that we do not have complete data
on the life cycle of the two cohorts that we are interested in. In fact, individuals’
ages were, respectively, 69-78 and 49-58 in the 1936-1945 and 1956-1965 cohorts as of
year 2014. We use older cohorts to extrapolate outcomes for the missing periods for
our cohorts of interest, and we start estimation at age 50 so that the 1960s cohort is
observed for a few waves in our sample.
Thus, our sample selection for the HRS is as follows. Of the 449,940 observations
initially present, we delete those with missing crucial information (e.g., on marital
status), and we select waves since 1996. We then select individuals in the age range
50-100. Given that we use years from 1996 to 2014, these people were born between
1906 and 1964. After keeping white and non-college-graduates and spouses, we have
19,377 individuals and 110,923 observations, as detailed in Table 3.
3 Changes in wages, medical expenses, and life ex-
pectancy across cohorts
In this section, we describe the observed changes in wages, medical expenses,6
and life expectancy experienced by white, non-college-educated Americans born in
6All amounts in the paper are expressed in 2016 dollars.
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Selection Individuals Observations
Initial sample 37,495 449,940
Non-missing information 37,152 217,574
Wave 1996 or later 35,936 204,922
Age 50 to 100 34,775 197,431
White 25,693 152,688
Non-college graduates 19,377 110,923
Table 3: HRS sample selection
the 1960s compared with those born in the 1940s. We show that the wages of men
went down by 7%, while the wages of women went up by 9%. These changes do not
condition on human capital within an education group (we report wages per unit of
human capital in Section 6.1, after we make explicit how we model human capital).
We also show that, during retirement, out-of-pocket medical spending increased by
82%, while life expectancy decreased by 1.6 to 2 years.
3.1 Wages
Figure 1 displays smoothed average real wage profiles for labor market partici-
pants.7 We deflate all nominal variables using the CPI-U price index. Online Ap-
pendix B shows that the CPI-U is very close to the price indexes that have been
constructed for lower-income people and that, given our focus on the non-college-
educated population, are most appropriate for our analysis.
The left-hand panel displays wages for married men and women in the 1940s and
1960s cohort, while the right-hand panel displays the corresponding wages for single
people. Several features are worth noticing. First, the wages of men were much
higher than those of women in the 1940s birth cohort. Second, the wages of men,
both married and single, went down by 9%. Third, the wages of married and single
women went up by 7% across these two cohorts.
7To compute these average wage profiles, we first regress log wages on fixed effect regressions
with a flexible polynomial in age, separately for men and women. We then regress the sum of the
fixed effects and residuals from these regressions on cohort and marital status dummies to fix the
position of the age profile. Finally, we model the variance of the shocks by fitting age polynomials
to the squared residuals from each regression in logs, and use it to compute the level of average
wages of each group as a function of age (by adding half the variance to the average in logs before
exponentiating).
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Our model, however, requires potential wages as an input. Because the wage
is missing for those who are not working, we impute missing wages (see details in
Online Appendix C). Figure 2 shows our estimated potential wage profiles. Potential
wages for men are similar to observed wages for labor market participants, except
that potential wages drop faster than observed wages after age 55. Potential wages
for women not only drop faster after middle age than observed wages, but also tend
to be lower and grow more slowly at younger ages due to positive selection of women
in the labor market.
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Figure 1: Wage profiles, comparing 1960s and 1940s for married people (left panel) and
single people (right panel)
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Figure 2: Potential wage profiles, comparing 1960s and 1940s for married people (left
panel) and single people (right panel)
Both figures display overall similar patterns and, in particular, imply that the
large wage gap between men and women in the 1940s cohort significantly decreased
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for the 1960s cohort because of increasing wages for women and decreasing wages for
men.
3.2 Medical expenses
We use the HRS data to compute out-of-pocket medical expenses during retire-
ment for the 1940s and 1960s cohorts.8 Figure 3 indicates a large increase in real
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Figure 3: Average out-of-pocket medical expenses for the cohorts born in the 1940s and
1960s
average expected out-of-pocket medical expenses across cohorts. For instance, at age
66, out-of-pocket medical expenses expressed in 2016 dollars are $2,878 and $5,236,
respectively, for the 1940s and 1960s birth cohorts. The corresponding numbers for
someone who survives to age 90 are $5,855 and $10,655. Thus, average out-of-pocket
medical expenses after age 66 are expected to increase across cohorts by 82%. These
are dramatic increases for two cohorts that are only 20 years apart.
3.3 Life expectancy
Case and Deaton (2015, 2017) use data from the National Vital Statistics to study
mortality by age over time and find that, interrupting a long time trend in mortal-
8To generate this graph, we regress the logarithm of out-of-pocket medical expenses on a fixed
effect and a third-order polynomial in age. We then regress the sum of the fixed effects and residuals
from this regression on cohort dummies to compute the average effect for each cohort of interest,
and we add the cohort dummies into the age profile. Finally, we model the variance of the shocks
fitting an age polynomial and cohort dummies to the squared residuals from the regression in logs
and use it to construct average medical expenses as a function of age.
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ity declines, the mortality of white, middle-age, and non-college-educated Americans
went up during the 1999 to 2015 time period. In particular, they found that individ-
uals age 55-59 in 2015 (and thus born in 1956-1960) faced a 22% increase in mortality
with respect to individuals age 55-59 in 1999 (and thus born in 1940-1944). Looking
at a younger group, they find that individuals age 50-54 in 2015 (thus born in 1961-
1965) experienced a 28% increase in mortality compared with individuals in the same
age group and born 16 years earlier.
Using the HRS data, we find that mortality at age 50 increased by about 27%
from the 1940s to the 1960s cohort.9 Thus, the increases in mortality in the HRS
data are in line with those found by Case and Deaton.
To further understand the HRS’s data implications about mortality and their
changes across our two cohorts, we also report the life expectancies that are implied
by our HRS data. Table 4 shows that life expectancy at age 50 was age 79.6 and 83.5
for men and women, respectively, in the cohort born in the 1940s. Conditional on
being alive at age 66, men and women in this cohort expect to live until age 82.5 and
85.7, respectively. It also shows that the life expectancy of men at age 50 declined by
2 years across our two cohorts, which is a large decrease for cohorts that are 20 years
apart and during a period of increasing life expectancy for people in other groups.
The table also reveals two other interesting facts. First, the life expectancy of 50-
year-old women in the same group also decreased by 2 years. Second, life expectancy
at age 66 fell slightly less than life expectancy at age 50 (by 1.6 years for men and
1.7 for women).10
Men, 1940 Men, 1960 Women, 1940 Women, 1960
At age 50 79.6 77.5 83.5 81.5
At age 66 82.5 80.9 85.7 84.0
Table 4: Life expectancy for white and non-college-educated men and women born in the
1940s and 1960s cohorts. HRS data
9We obtain the results in this section by estimating the probability of being alive conditional
on age and cohort and by assuming that the age profiles entering the logit regression are the same
across cohorts up to a constant. We then compute the mortality rate for the cohorts of interest
using the appropriate cohort dummy.
10Our estimated increases for medical expenses and mortality are consistent with the data that
we currently observe at the aggregate level and the individual level, respectively, and forecast trends
in these variables for the remaining periods of the lives of our cohorts.
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As a comparison, for the year 2005, the life tables provided by the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (Arias et al., 2010) report a life expectancy at age 66
(and thus for people born in the 1940s) of 82.1 and 84.7 for white men and women,
respectively. Compared to the official life tables, we thus slightly overestimate life
expectancy, especially for women, a result that possibly reflects that the HRS sample
is drawn from non-institutionalized, and thus initially healthier, individuals. After
the initial sampling, people ending up in nursing homes in subsequent periods stay
in the HRS data set.
One might wonder whether people born in the 1960s were aware that their life
expectancy was shorter than that of previous generations. To evaluate this, we use
the HRS question about one’s subjective probability of being alive at age 75. As
Table 5 shows, people born in the 1960s did adjust their life expectancy downward
compared to those born in the 1940s. That is, men age 55 and born in the 1940s
report, on average, a subjective probability of being alive at age 75 of 61%, compared
with 56% for those born in the 1960s. For women, the drop is even larger, going from
66% for those born in the 1940s to 58% for those born in the 1960s.
Men Women
Born in 1940s 61 66
Born in 1960s 56 58
Table 5: Average subjective probability (in percentage) of being alive at age 75 reported
by people age 54-56 who are white and non-college-educated. HRS data
4 Labor market and savings outcomes for the 1960s
cohort
Figure 4 displays the smoothed life cycle profiles of participation, hours worked
by workers, and assets for the 1960s cohort, by gender and marital status. Its left
panel highlights several important patterns.11 First, married men have the highest
labor market participation. Second, the participation of single men drops faster by
11The smoothed profiles of participation and hours are obtained by regressing each variable on
a fourth-order polynomial in age fully interacted with marital status, and on cohort dummies, also
interacted with marital status, which pick up the position of the age profiles. For assets, the profiles
are obtained by fitting age polynomials separately for single men, single women, and couples to the
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Figure 4: Participation, hours by workers, and average assets for the cohort born in 1960
age than that of married men. Third, single women have a participation profile that
looks like a shifted-down version of that of married men. Lastly, married women have
the lowest participation until age 40, but it then surpasses that of single men and
single women up to age 65.
The right panel displays hours worked conditional on participation, with married
men working the most hours, followed by single men, single women, and married
women until age 60. The bottom panel of the figure displays savings accumulation
up to age 65 and shows that couples start out with more assets than singles and that
this gap widens with age, to peak at about two by retirement time.
We see these outcomes as important aspects of the data that we require our model
to match in order to trust its implications about the effects of the changes in their
logarithm of assets plus shift parameter, also controlling for cohort. The variance of the shocks is
modeled by fitting age polynomials to the squared residuals from the regression in logs and is used
to obtain the average profile in levels. Our figures display the profiles for the 1960s cohort.
13
lifetime opportunities that we consider.
5 The model
The model that we use is a version of that in Borella et al. (2017). Thus, we
follow their exposition closely. A model period is one year long. People start their
economic life at age 25, stop working at age 66 at the latest, and live up to age 99.
During the working stage, people choose how much to save and how much to work,
face wage shocks and, if they are married, divorce shocks. Single people meet partners.
For tractability, we make the following assumptions. People who are married to each
other have the same age. Marriage, divorce, and fertility are exogenous. Women have
an age-varying number of children that depends on their age and marital status. We
estimate all of these processes from the data.
During the retirement stage, people face out-of-pocket medical expenses that are
net of Medicare and private insurance payments, and are partly covered by Medicaid.
Married retired couples also face the risk of one of the spouses dying. Single retired
people face the risk of their own death. We allow mortality risk and medical expenses
to depend on gender, age, health status, and marital status.
We allow for both time costs and monetary costs of raising children and running
households. In terms of time costs, we allow for available time to be split between
work and leisure and to depend on gender and marital status. We interpret available
time as net of home production, child care, and elderly care that one has to perform
whether working or not (and that is not easy to outsource). In addition, all workers
have to pay a fixed cost of working, which depends on their age.
The monetary costs enter our model in two ways. There is an adult-equivalent
family size that affects consumption. In addition, when women work, they have to
pay a child care cost that depends on the age and number of their children, and on
their own earnings. We assume that child care costs are a normal good: women with
higher earnings pay for more expensive child care.
We assume that households have rational expectations about all of the stochastic
processes that they face. Thus, they anticipate the nature of the uncertainty in our
environment starting from age 25, when they enter our model.
14
5.1 Preferences
Let t be age ∈ {t0, t1, ..., tr, ..., td}, with t0 = 25, tr = 66 being retirement time
and td = 99 being the maximum possible life span. For simplicity of notation, think
of the model as being written for one cohort; thus, age t also indexes the passing of
time for that cohort. We solve the model for our 1960s cohort and then perform our
counterfactuals by changing some of its inputs to those of the 1940s cohort.
Households have time-separable preferences and discount the future at rate β.
The superscript i denotes gender, with i = 1, 2 being a man or a woman, respectively.
The superscript j denotes marital status, with j = 1, 2 being single or in a couple,
respectively.
Each single person has preferences over consumption and leisure, and the period
flow of utility is given by the standard CRRA utility function
vi(ct, lt) =
((ct/η
i,1
t )
ωl1−ωt )
1−γ − 1
1− γ + b,
where ct is consumption, η
i,j
t is the equivalent scale in consumption (which is a function
of family size, including children) and ηi,1t corresponds to that for singles, while b ≥ 0
is a parameter that ensures that people are happy to be alive, as in Hall and Jones
(2007). The latter allows us to properly evaluate the welfare effects of changing life
expectancy.
The term li,jt is leisure, which is given by
li,jt = L
i,j − nt − Φi,jt Int ,
where Li,j is available time endowment, which can be different for single and married
men and women and should be interpreted as available time net of home production.
Leisure equals available time endowment less nt, hours worked on the labor market,
less the fixed time cost of working. That is, the term Int is an indicator function
that equals 1 when hours worked are positive and zero otherwise, while the term Φi,jt
represents the fixed time cost of working.
The fixed cost of working should be interpreted as including commuting time, time
spent getting ready for work, and so on. We allow it to depend on gender, marital
status, and age because working at different ages might imply different time costs for
married and single men and women. We assume the following functional form: whose
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three parameters we calibrate using our structural model:
Φi,jt =
exp(φi,j0 + φ
i,j
1 t+ φ
i,j
2 t
2)
1 + exp(φi,j0 + φ
i,j
1 t+ φ
i,j
2 t
2)
.
We assume that couples maximize their joint utility function
w(ct, l
1
t , l
2
t ) =
((ct/η
i,2
t )
ω(l1t )
1−ω)1−γ − 1
1− γ + b+
((ct/η
i,2
t )
ω(l2t )
1−ω)1−γ − 1
1− γ + b.
Note that for couples, the economy of scale term ηi,2t is the same for both genders.
5.2 The environment
Households hold assets at, which earn rate of return r. The timing is as follows. At
the beginning of each working period, each single individual observes his/her current
idiosyncratic wage shock, age, assets, and accumulated earnings. Each married person
also observes their partner’s labor wage shock and accumulated earnings. At the
beginning of each retirement period, each single individual observes his/her current
age, assets, health, and accumulated earnings. Each married person also observes
their partner’s health and accumulated earnings. Decisions are made after everything
has been observed, and new shocks hit at the end of the period after decisions have
been made.
5.2.1 Human capital and wages
We take education at age 25 as given but explicitly model human capital accu-
mulation after that age. To do so, we define human capital, y¯it, as one’s average
past earnings at each age. Thus, our definition of human capital implies that it is a
function of one’s initial wages and schooling and subsequent labor market experience
and wages.12
There are two components to wages. The first is a deterministic function of human
capital: ei,jt (y¯
i
t). The second component is a persistent earnings shock 
i
t that evolves
as follows:
ln it+1 = ρ
i
ε ln 
i
t + υ
i
t, υ
i
t ∼ N(0, (σiυ)2).
12It also has the important benefit of allowing us to have only one state variable keeping track of
human capital and Social Security contributions.
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The product of ei,jt (·) and it determines an agent’s hourly wage.
5.2.2 Marriage and divorce
During the working period, a single person gets married with an exogenous prob-
ability that depends on his/her age and gender. The probability of getting married
at the beginning of next period is νit+1.
Conditional on meeting a partner, the probability of meeting a partner p with
wage shock pt+1 is
ξt+1(·) = ξt+1(pt+1|it+1, i). (1)
Allowing this probability to depend on the wage shock of both partners generates
assortative mating. We assume random matching over assets at+1 and average accu-
mulated earnings of the partner y¯pt+1, conditional on the partner’s wage shock. We
estimate the distribution of partners over these state variables from the PSID data
(see Online Appendix C, Marriage and divorce probabilities subsection, for details)
and denote it by
θt+1(·) = θt+1(apt+1, y¯pt+1|pt+1), (2)
where the variables apt+1, y¯
p
t+1, 
p
t+1 stand for the partner’s assets, human capital, and
wage shock, respectively.
A working-age couple can be hit by a divorce shock at the end of the period that
depends on age, ζt. If the couple divorces, they split the assets equally, and each
of the ex-spouses moves on with those assets and their own wage shock and Social
Security contributions.
After retirement, single people don’t get married anymore. People in couples no
longer divorce and can lose their spouse only because of death. This is consistent with
the data because in this cohort, marriages and divorces after retirement are rare.
5.2.3 The costs of raising children and running a household
Consistently with the data for this cohort, we assume that single men do not
have children. We keep track of the total number of children and children’s age as a
function of mother’s age and marital status. The total number of children by one’s age
affects the economies of scale of single women and couples. We denote by f 0,5(i, j, t)
and f 6,11(i, j, t) the number of children from 0 to 5 and from 6 to 11, respectively.
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The term τ 0,5c is the child care cost for each child age 0 to 5, while τ
6,11
c is the child
care cost for each child age 6 to 11. Both are expressed as a fraction of the earnings
of the working mother.
The number of children between ages 0 to 5 and 6 to 11, together with the per-
child child care costs by age of child, determine the child care costs of working mothers
(i = 2). Because we assume that child care costs are proportional to earnings, if a
woman does not work outside the home, her earnings are zero and so are her child
care costs. This amounts to assuming that she provides the child care herself.
5.2.4 Medical expenses and death
After retirement, surviving people face medical expenses, health shocks, and death
shocks. At age 66, we endow people with a distribution of health that depends on
their marital status and gender (see Online Appendix C, Health status at retirement
subsection).
Health status ψit can be either good or bad and evolves according to a Markov
process pii,jt (ψ
i
t) that depends on age, gender, and marital status. Medical expenses
mi,jt (ψ
i
t) and survival probabilities s
i,j
t (ψ
i
t) are functions of age, gender, marital status,
and health status.
5.2.5 Initial conditions
We take the fraction of single and married people at age 25 and their distribution
over the relevant state variables from the PSID data. We list all of our state variables
in Section 5.4.
5.3 The government
We model taxes on total income Y as in Gouveia and Strauss (1994), and we allow
them to depend on marital status as follows:
T (Y, j) = (bj − bj(sjY + 1)− 1pj )Y.
The government also uses a proportional payroll tax τSSt on labor income, up to a
Social Security cap y˜t, to help finance old age Social Security benefits. We allow both
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the payroll tax and the Social Security cap to change over time for the 1960 cohort,
as in the data.
We use human capital y¯it (computed as an individual’s average earnings at age t)
to determine both wages and old-age Social Security payments. While Social Security
benefits for a single person are a function of one’s average lifetime earnings, Social
Security benefits for a married person are the highest of one’s own benefit entitlement
and half of the spouse’s entitlement while the other spouse is alive (spousal benefit).
After one’s spousal death, one’s Social Security benefits are given by the highest of
one’s benefit entitlement and the deceased spouse’s (survival benefit).
The insurance provided by Medicaid and SSI in old age is represented by a means-
tested consumption floor, c(j).13
5.4 Recursive formulation
We define and compute six sets of value functions: the value function of working
age singles, the value function of retired singles, the value function of working age
couples, the value function of retired couples, the value function of an individual who
is of working age and in a couple, and the value function of an individual who is
retired and in a couple.
5.4.1 The singles: working age and retirement
The state variables for a single individual during one’s working period are age t,
gender i, assets ait, the persistent earnings shock 
i
t, and average realized earnings y¯
i
t.
The corresponding value function is
W s(t, i, ait, 
i
t, y¯
i
t) = max
ct,at+1,nit
(
vi(ct, l
i,j
t ) + β(1− νt+1(i))EtW s(t+ 1, i, ait+1, it+1, y¯it+1)+
βνt+1(i)Et
[
Wˆ c(t+ 1, i, ait+1 + a
p
t+1, 
i
t+1, 
p
t+1, y¯
i
t+1, y¯
p
t+1)
])
(3)
li,jt = L
i,j − nit − Φi,jt Init , (4)
Y it = e
i,j
t (y¯
i
t)
i
tn
i
t, (5)
13Borella et al. (2018a) discuss Medicaid rules and observed outcomes after retirement.
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τc(i, j, t) = τ
0,5
c f
0,5(i, j, t) + τ 6,11c f
6,11(i, j, t), (6)
T (·) = T (rat + Yt, j), (7)
ct + at+1 = (1 + r)a
i
t + Y
i
t (1− τc(i, j, t))− τSSt min(Y it , y˜t)− T (·), (8)
y¯it+1 = (y¯
i
t(t− t0) + (min(Y it , y˜t)))/(t+ 1− t0), (9)
at ≥ 0, nt ≥ 0, ∀t. (10)
The expectation of the value function next period if one remains single integrates
over one’s wage shock next period. When one gets married, we not only take a similar
expectation, but also integrate over the distribution of the state variables of one’s
partner: (ξt+1(
p
t+1|it+1, i) is the distribution of the partner’s wage shock defined in
Equation (1), and θt+1(·) is the distribution of the partner’s assets and human capital
defined in Equation (2)).
The value function Wˆ c is the discounted present value of the utility for the same
individual, once he or she is in a married relationship with someone with given state
variables, not the value function of the married couple, which counts the utility of
both individuals in the relationship. We discuss the computation of the value function
of an individual in a marriage later in this section.
Equation (5) shows that the deterministic component of wages is a function of
age, gender, marital status, and human capital.
Equation (9) describes the evolution of human capital, which we measure as av-
erage accumulated earnings (up to the Social Security earnings cap y˜t) and that we
use as a determinant of future wages and Social Security payments after retirement.
During the last working period, a person takes the expected values of the value
functions during the first period of retirement. The state variables for a retired
single individual are age t, gender i, assets ait, health ψ
i
t, and average realized lifetime
earnings y¯ir. Because we assume that the retired individual can no longer get married,
his or her recursive problem can be written as
Rs(t, i, at, ψ
i
t, y¯
i
r) = max
ct,at+1
(
vi(ct, L
i,j) + βsi,jt (ψ
i
t)EtR
s(t+ 1, i, at+1, ψ
i
t+1, y¯
i
r)
)
(11)
Yt = SS(y¯r) (12)
T (·) = T (Yt + rat, j) (13)
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B(at, Yt, ψ
i
t, c(j)) = max
{
0, c(j)− [(1 + r)at + Yt −mi,jt (ψit)− T (·)]
}
(14)
ct + at+1 = (1 + r)at + Yt +B(at, Yt, ψ
i
t, c(j))−mi,jt (ψit)− T (·) (15)
at+1 ≥ 0, ∀t (16)
at+1 = 0, if B(·) > 0. (17)
The term si,jt (ψ
i
t) is the survival probability as a function of age, gender, marital
status, and health status. The expectation of the value function next period is taken
with respect to the evolution of health.
The term SS(y¯r
i) represents Social Security, which for the single individual is a
function of the income earned during their work life, y¯ir, and the functionB(at, Y
i
t , ψ
i
t, c(j))
represents old-age means-tested government transfers such as Medicaid and SSI, which
ensure a minimum consumption floor c(j).
5.4.2 The couples: working age and retirement
The state variables for a married couple in the working stage are (t, at, 
1
t , 
2
t , y¯
1
t , y¯
2
t )
where 1 and 2 refer to gender, and the recursive problem for the married couple (j = 2)
before tr can be written as
W c(t, at, 
1
t , 
2
t , y¯
1
t , y¯
2
t ) = max
ct,at+1,n1t ,n
2
t
(
w(ct, l
1,j
t , l
2,j
t )
+ (1− ζt+1)βEtW c(t+ 1, at+1, 1t+1, 2t+1, y¯1t+1, y¯2t+1)
+ ζt+1β
2∑
i=1
(
EtW
s(t+ 1, i, at+1/2, 
i
t+1, y¯
i
t+1)
)) (18)
li,jt = L
i,j − nit − Φi,jt Init , (19)
Y it = e
i,j
t (y¯
i
t)
i
tn
i
t, (20)
τc(i, j, t) = τ
0,5
c f
0,5(i, j, t) + τ 6,11c f
6,11(i, j, t), (21)
T (·) = T (rat + Y 1t + Y 2t , j) (22)
ct+at+1 = (1+r)at+Y
1
t +Y
2
t (1−τc(2, 2, t))−τSSt (min(Y 1t , y˜t)+min(Y 2t , y˜t))−T (·) (23)
y¯it+1 = (y¯
i
t(t− t0) + (min(Y it , y˜t)))/(t+ 1− t0), (24)
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at ≥ 0, n1t , n2t ≥ 0, ∀t. (25)
The expected value of the couple’s value function is taken with respect to the condi-
tional probabilities of the two t+1s given the current values of the ts for each of the
spouses (we assume independent draws). The expected values for the newly divorced
people are taken using the appropriate conditional distribution for their own labor
wage shocks.
During their last working period, couples take the expected values of the value
functions for the first period of retirement. During retirement, that is, from age tr
on, each of the spouses is hit with a health shock ψit and a realization of the survival
shock si,2t (ψ
i
t). Symmetrically with the other shocks, s
1,2
t (ψ
1
t ) is the after-retirement
survival probability of the husband, while s2,2t (ψ
2
t ) is the survival probability of the
wife. We assume that the health shocks of each spouse are independent of each other
and that the death shocks of each spouse are also independent of each other.
In each period, the married couple’s (j = 2) recursive problem during retirement
can be written as
Rc(t, at, ψ
1
t , ψ
2
t , y¯
1
r , y¯
2
r) = max
ct,at+1
(
w(ct, L
1,j, L2,j)+
βs1,jt (ψ
1
t )s
2,j
t (ψ
2
t )EtR
c(t+ 1, at+1, ψ
1
t+1, ψ
2
t+1, y¯
1
r , y¯
2
r)+
βs1,jt (ψ
1
t )(1− s2,jt (ψ2t ))EtRs(t+ 1, 1, at+1, ψ1t+1, y¯r)+
βs2,jt (ψ
2
t )(1− s1,jt (ψ1t ))EtRs(t+ 1, 2, at+1, ψ2t+1, y¯r)
) (26)
Yt = max
{
(SS(y¯1r) + SS(y¯
2
r),
3
2
max(SS(y¯1r), SS(y¯
2
r))
}
(27)
y¯r = max(y¯
1
r , y¯
2
r), (28)
T (·) = T (Yt + rat, j), (29)
B(at, Yt, ψ
1
t , ψ
2
t , c(j)) = max
{
0, c(j)−[(1 + r)at + Yt −m1,jt (ψ1t )−m2,jt (ψ2t )− T (·)]}
(30)
ct + at+1 = (1 + r)at + Yt +B(at, Yt, ψ
1
t , ψ
2
t , c(j))−m1,jt (ψ1t )−m2,jt (ψ2t )− T (·) (31)
at+1 ≥ 0, ∀t (32)
at+1 = 0, if B(·) > 0. (33)
22
In Equation (27), Yt mimics the spousal benefit from Social Security, which gives
a married person the right to collect the higher of his or her own benefit entitlement
and half of the spouse’s entitlement. In Equation (28), y¯r represents survivorship
benefits from Social Security in case of death of one of the spouses. The survivor has
the right to collect the higher of his or her own benefit entitlement and the deceased
spouse’s entitlement.
5.4.3 The individuals in couples: working age and retirement
We have to compute the joint value function of the couple to appropriately com-
pute joint labor supply and savings under the married couple’s available resources.
However, when computing the value of getting married for a single person, the rel-
evant object for that person is his or her discounted present value of utility in the
marriage. We thus compute this object for a person of gender i who is married with
a specific partner,
Wˆ c(t, i, at, 
1
t , 
2
t , y¯
1
t , y¯
2
t ) = v
i(cˆt(·), lˆi,jt )+
β(1− ζt+1)EtWˆ c(t+ 1, i, aˆt+1(·), 1t+1, 2t+1, y¯1t+1, y¯2t+1)+
βζt+1EtW
s(t+ 1, i, aˆt+1(·)/2, it+1, y¯it+1),
(34)
where cˆt(·), lˆi,jt (·), and aˆt+1(·) are, respectively, optimal consumption from the per-
spective of the couple, leisure, and saving for an individual of gender i in a couple
with the given state variables.
During the retirement period, we have
Rˆc(t, i, at, ψ
1
t , ψ
2
t , y¯
1
r , y¯
2
r) = v
i(cˆt(·), Li,j) + βsi,jt (ψit)sp,jt (ψpt )EtRˆc(t+ 1, i, aˆt+1(·), ψ1t+1, ψ2t+1, y¯1r , y¯2r)+
βsi,jt (ψ
i
t)(1− sp,jt (ψpt ))EtRs(t+ 1, i, aˆt+1(·), ψit+1, y¯r),
(35)
where sp,jt (ψ
p
t ) is the survival probability of the partner of the person of gender i.
This continuation utility is needed to compute Equation (34) during the last working
period, when Wˆ c(·) is replaced by Rˆc(·).
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6 Estimation and calibration
We calibrate our model to match the data for the 1960s birth cohort by using a
two-step strategy, as in Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and De Nardi et al. (2010,
2016). Then, in a third step, as in De Nardi et al. (2017), we calibrate the parameter
b, which affects the utility of being alive. It is important to note that this parameter
does not change our decision rules and the data that we match and can thus be
calibrated after the other parameters are calibrated. Nonetheless, it is necessary to
calibrate it to properly evaluate welfare when life expectancy changes.
More specifically, in the third step, we choose b so that the value of statistical life
(VSL) implied by our model is in the middle of the range estimated by the empirical
literature. The VSL is defined as the compensation that people require to bear an
increase in their probability of death, expressed as dollars per death. For example,
suppose that people are willing to tolerate an additional fatality risk of 1/10, 000
during a given period for a compensation of $500 per person. Among 10,000 people
there will be one death, and it will cost the society 10,000 times $500 = $5 million,
which is the implied VSL.
6.1 First-step calibration and estimation for the 1960s cohort
In the first step, we use the data to compute the initial distributions of our model’s
state variables and estimate or calibrate the parameters that can be identified outside
our model. For instance, we estimate the probabilities of marriage, divorce, health
transitions, and death, the number and age of children by maternal age and marital
status, the wage processes, and medical expenses during retirement.
Our calibrated parameters are listed in Table 6. We set the interest rate r to
4% and the utility curvature parameter, γ, to 2.5. The equivalence scales are set to
ηi,jt = (j + 0.7 ∗ f i,jt )0.7, as estimated by Citro and Michael (1995). The term f i,jt is
the average total number of children for single and married men and women by age.
We use the tax function for married and single people estimated by Guner et al.
(2012). The retirement benefits at age 66 are calculated to mimic the Old Age and
Survivor Insurance component of the Social Security system. The most recent paper
estimating the consumption floor during retirement is the one estimated by De Nardi
et al. (2016) in a rich model of retirement with endogenous medical expenses. In
their framework, they estimate a utility floor that corresponds to consuming $4,600
24
Calibrated parameters Source
Preferences and returns
r Interest rate 4% De Nardi et al. (2016)
ηi,jt Equivalence scales PSID
γ Utility curvature parameter 2.5, see text
Government policy
bj , sj , pj Income tax Guner et al. (2012)
SS(y¯ir) Social Security benefit See text
τSSt Social Security tax rate See text
y˜t Social Security cap See text
c(1) Minimum consumption, singles $8,687, De Nardi et al. (2016)
c(2) Minimum consumption, couples $13,031, Social Security rules
Estimated processes Source
Wages
ei,jt (·) Endogenous age-efficiency profiles PSID
it Wage shocks PSID
Demographics
si,jt (ψ
i
t) Survival probability HRS
ζt Divorce probability PSID
νt(i) Probability of getting married PSID
ξt(·) Matching probability PSID
θt(·) Partner’s assets and earnings PSID
f0,5(i, j, t) Number of children age 0-5 PSID
f6,11(i, j, t) Number of children age 6-11 PSID
Health shock
mi,jt (ψ
i
t) Medical expenses HRS
pii,jt (ψ
i
t) Transition matrix for health status HRS
Table 6: First-step inputs summary
a year when healthy. However, they note that Medicaid recipients are guaranteed
a minimum income of $6,670. As a compromise, we use $5,900 as our consumption
floor for elderly singles, which is $8,687 in 2016 dollars, and the one for couples to be
1.5 the amount for singles, which is the statutory ratio between benefits of couples to
singles.
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In the subsections that follow, we describe the estimation of our wage functions,
medical expenses, and survival probabilities. More details about all of our first-step
inputs are in Online Appendix C.
6.1.1 Wage schedules
We estimate wage schedules using the PSID data and regressing the logarithm of
potential wage for person k at age t,
lnwagekt = dk + f
i(t) +
G∑
g=1
βgDg ln(y¯kt + δy) + ukt,
on a fixed effect dk, a polynomial f in age t for each gender i, gender-cohort dummies
Dg interacted with human capital y¯kt and a shift parameter δy (to be able to take
logs). Thus, we allow all coefficients to be gender-specific and for the coefficient on
human capital to also depend on cohort.
We then regress the sum of the fixed effects and the residuals for each person on
cohort and marital status dummies and their interactions, separately for each gender,
and use the estimated effects for gender, marital status, and cohort as shifters for the
wage profiles of each demographic group and cohort.
Men Women
Age overall 0.0015 0.0017***
Age = 30 0.0043 0.0012***
Age = 40 0.0039 0.0056***
Age = 50 -0.0018 0.0044***
Age = 60 -0.013** -0.0025**
Married and born in 1960s vs. 1940s -0.642*** -0.395***
Single and born in 1960s vs. 1940s -0.660*** -0.381***
ln(y¯t + δy) and born in 1940s 0.256*** 0.363***
ln(y¯t + δy) and born in 1960s 0.347*** 0.413***
Table 7: Estimation results for potential wages, reported as percentage changes in poten-
tial wages due to one-unit increases in the relevant variables (or changes from
zero to one in case of dummy variables). In the case of y¯t we report the elasticity.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 7 reports the results of our estimated equation for potential wages.14 It
shows that the effects of age on potential wages are small, especially for men.15 The
largest age effect for men is at age 60, when their potential wage declines by 1.3%.
Women’s potential wages, instead, grow on average by half a percentage point until
age 50 and decline only mildly around age 60.
In terms of the position of the age profile, the effect of being born in the 1960s
cohort instead of the 1940s cohort is large and negative, especially for married and
single men. Because these declines depend on one’s human capital level, we discuss
their magnitudes when illustrating the interaction between wages and human capital
for the two cohorts in Figure 5. In contrast to this decline, however, returns to human
capital went up for the 1960s cohort compared to the 1940s cohort, as our estimated
elasticity of wages to human capital increases from 0.256 and 0.363 for the 1940s
cohort to 0.347 and 0.413 for the 1960s one, respectively, for men and women.
To better understand the implications of our estimates by cohort and subgroup,
Figure 5 reports our estimated average wage profiles by age conditional on a fixed
level of human capital during all of the working period. The human capital levels over
which we condition are the 0th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 99th percentiles of the distributions
of average accumulated earnings of men and women in our sample. They correspond
to, respectively, $0, $30,100, $41,300, $51,600, and $79,100 for men and to $0, $5,000,
$13,900, $23,700, and $55,900 for women (expressed in 2016 dollars). In these graphs,
therefore, human capital is held fixed by age. The top graphs are for married people,
and the bottom ones refer to singles. The graphs on the left are for men, and those
on the right for women. The solid lines refer to the 1960s cohort, the dashed ones to
the 1940s cohort.
In sum, these graphs display wages as a function of age for single and married
men and women in our two cohorts for five fixed levels of human capital. Hence,
they illustrate the changes in the returns to human capital across cohorts and marital
status for various human capital levels.
Focusing on married men with zero human capital (the lowest two lines in the top
graph on the left), the effect of the lower position of the age profile for the 1960s cohort
14We report the percentage changes in potential wages by exponentiating the relevant marginal
effect for each variable, βx, and reporting it as exp(βx)−1. In the case of y¯t, the estimated coefficient
is an elasticity, and we report it without any transformations.
15As we do not observe the complete profile for those born in the 1960s, the shape of the age
profile is assumed to be the same across generations.
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is apparent: married men entering the labor market receive an average potential
hourly wage that is 3.5 dollars lower than that received by the same men in the 1940s
cohort. At higher levels of human capital, the disadvantage is progressively reduced
by the higher returns to human capital but is still not enough to counterbalance the
drop in the level of all wages. Even at the highest level of human capital within the
non-college-graduate group, the hourly wage for married men born in the 1960s is
still 90 cents lower than that received by the same men in the 1940s. The bottom
left panel displays the wages of single men and shows that their drops are even larger
than those for married men at all human capital levels.
The right panels refer to the wages of women. The wages of married women
(top panel) with zero human capital went down by about 0.9 dollars, a much smaller
decrease across cohorts than that for men, both in absolute value and in percentage
terms. As a consequence of the increased returns to human capital, at the median
human capital level for women, their wage is 0.6 dollars lower, while it is actually
higher for the high-human-capital women in the 1960s than the 1940s cohort, by
0.3 dollars. The main difference between married and single women is that, from
the 1940s to the 1960s, only married women in the top 1% of the human capital
distribution experienced a wage increase, while single women in the top 15% of the
human capital distribution experienced a wage increase.
In sum, we find that men and women in the 1960s cohort had a higher return to
human capital but lower cohort-and-gender-age wage profiles compared to those born
in the 1940s. The latter drop was especially large for men. These changes imply that
men and women with lower human capital had the largest drop, that wages dropped
for men at all human capital levels, and that the wages of the highest human capital
women increased. As a result of these changes in the wage structure and a larger
increase in women’s human capital (partly due to more years of education and partly
due to more labor market experience), average wages over the life cycle, shown in
Figure 2, were higher for women and lower for men in the 1960s cohort.
6.1.2 Medical expenses
We estimate out-of-pocket medical expenses using the HRS data and regressing
the logarithm of medical expenses for person k at age t,
ln(mkt) = X
m′
kt β
m + αmk + u
m
kt,
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Figure 5: Wages as a function of human capital levels. Top graphs: married people.
Bottom graphs: single people. Left graphs: men. Right graphs: women. The
dashed lines refer to the cohort born in 1940 and the solid lines to that born
in 1960, conditional on a fixed gender-specific level of human capital, measured
at the 0th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 99th percentiles of the distributions of average
accumulated earnings in our sample.
where the explanatory variables include a third-order polynomial in age fully inter-
acted with gender, current health status, and interactions between these variables.16
The term αmk represents a fixed effect and takes into account all unmeasured fixed-
over-time characteristics that may bias the age profile, such as differential mortality,
as discussed in De Nardi et al. (2010). We then regress the residuals from this equa-
tion on cohort, gender, and marital status dummies to compute the average effect
for each group of interest. Hence, the profile of the logarithm of medical expenses is
constant across cohorts up to a constant.
16We experimented with adding marital status, but it is not statistically different from zero.
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Men Women
Age overall 0.024*** 0.026***
At age 66 0.022*** 0.019***
At age 76 0.017*** 0.014***
At age 86 0.017*** 0.027***
At age 96 0.023*** 0.058***
Bad health 0.201*** 0.209***
Married 0.327*** 0.327***
Born in 1960s 0.486*** 0.486***
Table 8: Estimation results for medical expenses for men and women, reported as per-
centage changes in medical expenses due to marginal increases in the relevant
variables (or changes from zero to one in case of dummy variables). HRS data.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 8 reports the results from our estimates for medical expenses17 and shows
that after age 66, real medical expenses increase with age on average by 2.4 and 2.6%
for men and women, respectively, with the growth for women being much faster than
for men after age 76, reaching, for example, 5.8% at age 96. Finally, those born in
the 1960s cohort face medical expenses that are 48.6% higher than those born in the
1940s cohort, even after conditioning on health status.
6.1.3 Life expectancy
As described in our model section, we allow mortality to depend on health, gender,
marital status, and age, and we have health evolving over time, depending on previous
health, age, gender, and marital status. We allow cohort effects to affect all of these
dynamics and their initial conditions, both in our estimation of these inputs and in
our model.
More specifically, we model the probability of being alive at time t as a logit
function,
st = Prob(Alivet = 1 | Xst ) =
exp(Xs′t β
s)
1 + exp(Xs′t βs)
,
which we estimate using the HRS data. Among the explanatory variables, we include
a third-order polynomial in age, gender, marital status, and health status in the
17We report the percentage changes in medical expenses by exponentiating the relevant marginal
effect for each variable, βx, and reporting it as exp(βx)− 1.
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previous period, as well as interactions between these variables and age, whenever
they are statistically different from zero. We also include cohort dummies and use
coefficients relative to the cohort of interest to adjust the constant accordingly.18
To investigate the implications of the cohort effects that we estimate through
these pathways, Table 9 reports the model-implied life expectancy at age 66 and
their changes when we add, in turn, the changes in mortality, health dynamics, initial
health at age 66, and initial fractions of married and single people that are driven by
cohort effects on each of those components.
The first line of the table reports life expectancy using all of the inputs that we
estimate for the 1960s cohort. Their implied life expectancy is very close to the one
we have computed using the data and a much simpler regression for mortality, and
reported in Section 3.3. The second line changes the observed relationship between
mortality and health and demographics from the one we estimate for the 1960s cohort
to the one we estimate for the 1940s cohort. It shows that this change alone implies
an increase of 0.8 and 0.7 years of life for men and women, respectively. In line three,
we switch from the 1960s to the 1940s health dynamics, and there is no noticeable
change in life expectancy because the health dynamics are very similar. In line 4,
we change the fraction of people who are in bad health at age 66, conditional on
marital status, to that of the 1940s cohort. This change implies a further increase of
0.1 years of life expectancy for both men and women, indicating that a smaller part
of the observed decrease in life expectancy at age 66 is captured by changing health
conditions at age 66. The last line of the table not only changes initial health at age
66, but also allows for the fact that more people were married in the 1940s cohort
compared to the 1960s cohort. This change in the fraction of married people at age
66 explains an additional change of 0.3 and 0.2 years of life for men and women,
respectively.
Our decomposition thus shows that the biggest change in life expectancy in our
framework comes from a change in the relationship between mortality and health
dynamics after age 66, while a smaller one stems from a worsening of initial health
status at age 66. Finally, the reduction in the fraction of married people also has a
non-negligible effect on life expectancy of both men and women. In our experiments
18We are thus assuming that the age profiles entering our estimated equation are the same across
cohorts up to a constant. We then compute the mortality rate for the cohorts of interest using the
appropriate cohort dummy.
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Men Women
1960s Inputs 80.8 84.5
1940s Survival functions 81.6 85.3
1940s Survival and health dynamics 81.6 85.3
1940s Survival, health dynamics, initial health 81.7 85.4
1940s Survival, health dynamics, initial health, and marital status 82.0 85.6
Table 9: Life expectancy at age 66 for white and non-college-educated men and women
born in the 1940s and 1960s cohorts as we turn on various determinants of mor-
tality. HRS data
changing life expectancy, we do not change marital status at age 25, and we thus
abstract from the effects of the small changes in life expectancy coming from that
channel.
6.2 Second-step calibration
In the second step, we calibrate 19 model parameters (β, ω, (φi,j0 , φ
i,j
1 , φ
i,j
2 ), (τ
0,5
c , τ
6,11
c ),
Li,j) so that our model mimics the observed life-cycle patterns of labor market par-
ticipation, hours worked conditional on working, and savings for married and single
men and women that we report in Figure 4.
Table 10 presents our calibrated preference parameters for the 1960s cohort. Our
calibrated discount factor is 0.981, and our calibrated weight on consumption is 0.416.
We normalize available time for single men to 5,840 hours a year (112.3 hours a
week) and calibrate available time for single women and married women and men.
Our calibration implies that single women have the same time endowment as single
men (112 hours a week). The corresponding time endowments for married men and
women are, respectively, 105 and 88 hours. This implies that people in the latter two
groups spend 7 and 24 hours a week, respectively, in non-market activities such as
running households, raising children, and taking care of aging parents. Our estimates
of non-market work time are similar to those reported by Aguiar and Hurst (2007)
and by Dotsey et al. (2014).
Our estimates for the 1960s cohort imply that the per-child child care cost of
having a child age 0-5 and 6-11 are, respectively, 35% and 3.0% of a woman’s earnings.
In the PSID data, child care costs are not broken down by age of the child, but per-
child child care costs (for all children in the age range 0-11) of a married woman are
32
33% and 19% of her earnings at ages 25 and 30, respectively. Computing our model’s
implications, we find that per-child child care costs (for all children in the age range
0-11) of a married woman are 30% and 23% of her earnings, respectively, at ages 25
and 30. Thus, our model infers child care costs that are similar to those in the PSID
data.
Calibrated parameters 1960s cohort
β: Discount factor 0.981
ω: Consumption weight 0.416
L2,1: Time endowment (weekly hours), single women 112
L1,2: Time endowment (weekly hours), married men 105
L2,2: Time endowment (weekly hours), married women 88
τ0,5c : Prop. child care cost for children age 0-5 35%
τ6,11c : Prop. child care cost for children age 6-11 3.0%
Φi,jt : Participation cost Fig. 6
Table 10: Second-step calibrated model parameters
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Age
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Pa
rtic
ipa
tio
n c
os
t
SM
SW
MM
MW
Figure 6: Calibrated labor participation costs, expressed as a fraction of the time endow-
ment of single men. SM: single men; SW: single women; MM: married men;
MW: married women. Model estimates
Figure 6 shows the calibrated profiles of labor participation costs by age, expressed
as a fraction of the time endowment of single men. Participation costs are relatively
high when young, decrease in middle age, and with the exception of single men,
increase after 45.
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6.3 Third-step calibration
To match the VSL, we proceed as follows. Because in our model we do not have
mortality until age 66, we review the value of statistical life estimated for older people
in previous empirical work. Within this literature, O’Brien (2013) estimates the value
of statistical life by examining consumer automobile purchases by individuals up to
85 years old. He finds that the VSL is respectively $8 million for the age 65-74 age
group and $7 million for the 75-85 age group (expressed in year 2009 dollars). Alberini
et al. (2004), instead, use contingent valuation surveys, which elicited respondents’
willingness to pay for reductions of mortality risk of different magnitudes, and find
values between $1 and $5 million for the 40 to 75 age group (expressed in year 2000
dollars). Thus, the range from these two papers, expressed in year 2016 dollars
(the base year that we use in this paper), is between $1 and $9 million. Then, we
choose b = 0.009 so that when we increase mortality after retirement and compute a
compensation that makes them indifferent between this counterfactual case and our
benchmark mortality, we obtain an average VSL at age 66 of $5 million.
6.4 Model fit
Figures 7 and 8 report our model-implied moments, as well as the moments and
95% confidence intervals from the PSID data for our 1960s cohort. They show that
our parsimoniously parameterized model (19 parameters and 448 targets) fits the
data well and reproduces the important patterns of participation, hours conditional
on participation, and asset accumulation for all four demographic groups.
7 The effects of changing wages, medical expenses,
and life expectancy
We now turn to evaluating the effects of the changes in wages, medical expenses,
and life expectancy that we have documented. Because we want to isolate the effects
of these changes on the 1960s cohort (while keeping everything else constant for this
cohort), we only replace these three sets of inputs with those experienced by the 1940s
cohort, first one at a time and then all at the same time. In doing so, we assume that,
as of age 25, the 1960s cohort have rational expectations about all of the stochastic
34
30 40 50 60
Age
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Labo
r Part
icipat
ion
Married men
Model
Data
Data, upper bound
Data, lower bound
30 40 50 60
Age
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Labo
r Part
icipat
ion
Married women
Model
Data
Data, upper bound
Data, lower bound
(a) Participation, couples
30 40 50 60
Age
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Labo
r Part
icipat
ion
Single men
Model
Data
Data, upper bound
Data, lower bound
30 40 50 60
Age
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Labo
r Part
icipat
ion
Single women
Model
Data
Data, upper bound
Data, lower bound
(b) Participation, singles
30 40 50 60
Age
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Hour
s am
ong w
orker
s
Married men
Model
Data
Data, upper bound
Data, lower bound
30 40 50 60
Age
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Hour
s am
ong w
orker
s
Married women
Model
Data
Data, upper bound
Data, lower bound
(c) Hours for workers, couples
30 40 50 60
Age
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Hour
s am
ong w
orker
s
Single men
Model
Data
Data, upper bound
Data, lower bound
30 40 50 60
Age
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Hour
s am
ong w
orker
s
Single women
Model
Data
Data, upper bound
Data, lower bound
(d) Hours for workers, singles
Figure 7: Model fit for participation (top four graphs) and hours (bottom four graphs)
and 95% confidence intervals from the PSID data
processes that they face over the rest of their lives, including when we switch some
of them to their 1940s counterparts.
We start by studying the implications of these changes for labor participation,
hours worked by workers, and savings for single and married men and women. Then,
to evaluate welfare, we compute a onetime asset compensation to be given upon
entering the model, that is, at age 25, that makes a household endowed with a given
set of state variables indifferent between facing the 1960s input and the 1940s input.19
19These computations are performed for each household while keeping fixed the assets of their
potential future partners to those that we estimate in the data.
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Figure 8: Model fit for assets and 95% confidence intervals from the PSID data
Finally, we compute the fraction of people that have lost or gained as a result of these
changes and report the average welfare loss experienced by single men, single women,
and married couples expressed as the average compensation that makes each of these
groups indifferent between the two set of inputs.
7.1 Changing wages
Figure 9 compares the participation, hours worked by workers, and savings for
the 1960s cohort under their own wage schedule and under the wage schedule of the
1940s cohort. It shows that, according to our model, all of these economic outcomes
would have been rather different under the 1940s wage schedule.
The largest effects occurred for married couples, with many more married women
participating and working more hours under the 1960s wage schedule, while their
husbands dropped out of the labor force at younger ages. At age 25, for instance,
the participation of married women was 8 percentage points higher. Married men’s
participation started dropping faster after age 30 and was 4 percentage points lower
than under the 1940s wage schedule at age 55. Hours worked by young married
women were about 100 hours a year higher, while hours worked by young married
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men were only slightly higher. These changes were due to much lower wages for men,
in conjunction with increasing returns to human capital. The latter, in particular,
increased the returns to working when young.
Single people were affected too. They were experiencing lower wages, for the most
part, and in the case of single women, they were also expecting to get married with
lower-wage husbands. This negative wealth effect makes them invest more in their
own human capital, work harder when young, and receive higher wages because of
higher human capital accumulation. Single men reacted little to these changes by
marginally reducing their participation, increasing hours worked while young, and
reducing them after age 50.
As a result of the changing wage schedule and endogenous labor market decisions,
average discounted lifetime income decreased by $115,000 (10%) for single men and
$108,000 (9%) for married men, but increased by $28,000 (5%) for single women
and $36,000 (7%) for married women. As households experienced the large negative
wealth effect coming from lower wages and earnings, retirement savings were much
lower. Assets at age 66 dropped by 21% for single men, 1.1% for single women, and
6.1% for couples, respectively.
Compared with 1940 wage schedule Single men Single women Couples
Men only 6.8% 2.9% 4.0%
Men and women 7.3% 3.4% 4.5%
No marriage and divorce economy
Men only 11.1% 0.0% 4.3%
Men and women 11.1% 0.7% 4.9%
Table 11: Welfare compensation for the 1960s cohort for facing the 1960s wage schedule
instead of the 1940s wage schedule, computed as a onetime asset compensation
at age 25 and expressed as a fraction of the present discounted value of one’s
income. Top panel, our benchmark economy, bottom panel, an economy without
marriage and divorce after age 25.
We now turn to evaluating how much worse (or better) people fared under the
1960s rather than the 1940s wage schedule.20 We start by studying the effects of
the wage changes for men only. In this case, everyone loses, and the onetime asset
compensation that we should give to 25-year-olds to make them indifferent between
20When changing the wage schedule, we keep everything else (including initial conditions and
prospective spouses) fixed at the levels experienced by the 1960s cohort.
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Figure 9: Model outcomes with 1960s and 1940s wage schedule
the two wage schedules for men is $68,300 for single men, $17,800 for single women,
and $64,800 for couples. The first line of Table 11 reports this compensation as a
fraction of the present value of lifetime income for each group. It amounts to 6.8%,
2.9%, and 4.0% for single men, single women, and couples, respectively.
We then turn to the welfare effects of having the wages of both men and women
set to the 1960s instead of 1940s wage schedules. Again, virtually everyone loses
as a result. The onetime asset compensation that we should give to 25-year-olds to
make them indifferent between the 1940s and the 1960s wages is $72,900 for single
men, $20,400 for single women, and $73,600 for couples. The second line of Table 11
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reports this compensation as a fraction of lifetime income for each group. It amounts
to 7.3%, 3.4%, and 4.5% for single men, single women, and couples, respectively.
Thus, everyone loses, and the welfare losses are big, both in absolute value and when
compared with the discounted value of lifetime income in each group.
To isolate the welfare effects coming from marriage and divorce dynamics, we also
compute an economy in which there is no marriage and divorce after age 25. In it, a
25-year-old single person stays single forever, and a 25-year-old married couple stays
married forever.21 The last two lines of Table 11 report the welfare losses of the losers
as a fraction of the present discounted value of lifetime income for each group.
When men’s wages drop in this economy, all men and couples lose as a result.
The onetime asset compensation that we should give to 25-year-olds to make them
indifferent between the 1940s and the 1960s men’s wages when there is no marriage
and divorce is $98,800 for single men, $0 for single women, and $72,000 for couples,
respectively. When the wages of both men and women change, all single men and
almost all couples lose, while 38% of single women gain. The single women who
gain are the high-human-capital ones who end up with higher wages. The welfare
compensation for those who lose when all wages change is, respectively, $98,800 for
single men, $5,400 for single women, and $80,500 for couples, respectively. The
average welfare gain among the 38% of single women who gain is $6,400.
Compared with our benchmark economy, in an economy without marital dynamics
after age 25, single men experience a larger welfare loss due to their much lower wages
and their inability to benefit from a future working spouse. In contrast, 38% of single
women gain when their wage goes up (those with high human capital), while the
other single women experience a smaller welfare loss because, while their wage goes
down, they no longer marry a husband with much lower wages and thus do not work
as hard to help support their family.
7.2 Changes in medical expenses
We now turn to studying the effects of replacing the out-of-pocket medical ex-
penses faced by the 1960s cohort with those faced by the 1940s cohort. The present
discounted value of medical expenses at age 25 for the 1960s cohort went up by
$5,000, $7,000, and $12,300 for single men, single women, and couples, respectively,
21To isolate the effect of wage changes, we eliminate marriage and divorce dynamics after age 25
from both the baseline and the counterfactual economies when performing these welfare comparisons.
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compared with the 1940s cohort. This corresponds to a 76% increase for single men,
single women, and couples.
Figure 10 shows that the main effects of these changes are that hours worked by
married women in the 1960s cohort under the 1960s inputs are slightly higher after
age 30, while those of single women, who are poorer and rely on the consumption
floor more, go down after age 55. Also, savings at age 66 were 14%, 11%, and 16%
higher for single men, single women, and couples in the 1960s cohort than they would
have been under the lower medical expenses experienced by the 1940s cohort.
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Figure 10: Model outcomes with 1960s and 1940s medical expenses
Turning to our welfare computations, the resulting onetime asset compensation
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that we should give to 25-year-olds to make them indifferent between the 1940s and
1960s medical expenses is $14,000 for single men, $6,000 for single women, and $14,900
for couples. These numbers correspond, respectively, to 1.4%, 1.0%, and 0.9% of
the present discounted value of their lifetime income. Despite the similar change in
medical expenses for single men and women, the compensation is smaller for single
women because they are poorer and rely on the consumption floor more. Thus, to
the extent that they are at the consumption floor, the size of their medical expenses
is not very important to them.
7.3 Changes in life expectancy
We endow the 1960s cohort with the mortality, that is, health initial, health tran-
sition, and survival function, and thus life expectancy, of the 1940s cohort. Because
we estimate out-of-pocket medical expenses as a function of age, gender, and health,
changing a cohort’s health and survival dynamics also changes its medical expenses.
In fact, moving from the 1940s to the 1960s health and survival dynamics not only
lowers survival, but, because people die off faster, also decreases the present dis-
counted value of medical expenses at age 25 by $600 (4.5%) for single men, by $670
(4.0%) for single women, and by $1,300 (4.3%) for couples. Thus, both life expectancy
and medical expenses go down as a result of these changes across cohorts.
Figure 11 compares the participation and hours of married and single men and
women under the two scenarios. It shows that participation and hours would have
been very similar under the two scenarios but that retirement savings would have been
6.4%, 6.0%, and 4.1% higher for single men, single women, and couples, respectively,
at retirement time under the 1940s health and survival dynamics. Thus, savings go
down, as one might expect, because of the shorter time period over which people
expect to have to finance retirement consumption and decreased medical spending.
Given that, in contrast, the life expectancy of the college educated (and their medical
expenses) went up over time, this change contributes to increasing the gap in their
retirement savings and thus wealth inequality across these education groups.
Hall and Jones (2007) and De Nardi et al. (2017) find that changes in life ex-
pectancy can have large effects on welfare. One mitigating factor in our framework
is that this lower life expectancy occurred together with lower medical expenses. In
our model, medical expenses are a shock reducing available resources; thus, reducing
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Figure 11: Model outcomes with 1960s and 1940s life expectancy
them increases welfare. This counters the loss in welfare due to a shorter life span.
We find the welfare cost due to a shorter life expectancy dominates the welfare
gain from reduced medical expenses and that all single men and women and married
couples lose welfare as a result. More specifically, the onetime asset compensation
that we have to give 25-year-old households to make them indifferent between the
1940s and the 1960s health and survival dynamics is $32,000 for single men, $15,000
for single women, and $36,000 for couples. These numbers correspond, respectively,
to 3.2%, 2.4%, 2.2% of the present discounted value of their lifetime income.22
22Decreasing the VSL by 40%, that is, reducing it from 5 to 3 million, decreases the welfare costs of
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7.4 All three changes together
As we have seen from our previous three decomposition exercises, changes in the
wage schedule had the largest effects on participation, hours, savings, and welfare.
The other two changes that we consider, the decrease in life expectancy and increase
in expected out-of-pocket medical costs, mostly affect retirement savings and partly
offset each other. They still have very sizeable welfare costs.
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(c) Assets
Figure 12: Model outcomes with all changes we consider
reduced life expectancy from 3.18% to 1.60% for single men, from 2.43% to 1.19% for single women,
and from 2.21% to 1.11% for couples. Increasing the VSL by 40%, that is, from 5 to 7 million, raises
the corresponding welfare costs from 3.18% to 4.80% for single men, from 2.43% to 3.72% for single
women, and from 2.21% to 3.36% for couples.
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Figure 12 shows that the effects of all of these changes imply large increases in
the participation of both married and single women, noticeable decreases in the par-
ticipation of married men after age 40, and almost no changes in the participation of
single men. Hours worked by married men and women changed in opposite directions,
while the hours of single men and women displayed some increases earlier on in their
working period. On net, these changes depressed the retirement savings of single men
while leaving those of couples and single women roughly unchanged.
All changes considered SM SW MM MW All
Average participation change -1.15 -0.23 -2.42 3.12 0.12
Average hours change 0.48 0.21 0.70 4.82 1.95
Table 12: Changes in participation rates (in percentage points) and hours (in percentages)
for the 1960s cohort when facing the 1960s inputs (wage schedules, medical
expenses, and life expectancies) compared to the 1940s ones. SM = single
men, SW = single women, MM = married men, MW = married women, All =
everyone.
Table 12 compares outcomes for 1960s cohort. Under the 1960s inputs (wage
schedules, medical expenses, and life expectancies), the participation rates of married
women over their working period were 3.12 percentage points higher than under the
1940s wage schedule, while those of married men were 2.42 percentage points lower.
Overall, participation was only 0.12 percentage points higher due to offsetting changes
across groups. Hours worked conditional on participation, however, were higher for
all groups and especially for married women, resulting in an additional 1.95% of hours
worked over the life cycle for this group.
As a result of all three changes together, the present discounted value of income
went down, by 9.9%, 4.6%, and 4.0% for single men, single women, and couples,
and the onetime welfare loss experienced by people in the 1960s cohort amounts to
$126,000 for single men, $44,000 for single women, and $132,000 for couples. The
fourth line of Table 13 reports that these numbers expressed as a fraction of their
average present discounted value of earnings are 12.5%, 7.2%, and 8.1%, respectively.
Thus, the resulting welfare loss due to the changes between the 1940s and the 1960s
birth cohort is very large.
Table 13 summarizes key information about the welfare losses and their sources.
The first column shows, for instance, that 58.4% of the total welfare loss that we
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Compared with 1940 inputs SM SW Couples
Wages 7.3% 3.4% 4.5%
Medical expenses 1.4% 1.0% 0.9%
Life expectancy 3.2% 2.4% 2.2%
All changes considered 12.5% 7.2% 8.1%
All changes considered, no marriage and divorce 15.2% 2.1% 8.7%
Table 13: Welfare compensation for the 1960s cohort when facing the 1960s wage sched-
ules, medical expenses, and life expectancies instead of the 1940s ones, com-
puted as onetime asset compensation at age 25 and expressed as a fraction of
the present discounted value of one’s income. SM = single men, SW = single
women.
consider for single men comes from wage changes and 25.6% comes from their decrease
in life expectancy. The second column shows that, for single women, 47.2% of the
welfare loss for single women comes from wage changes (their own and those of their
prospective husbands) and 33.3% of it comes from decreased life expectancy. The last
column refers to couples and shows that 55.6% of the welfare loss for couples comes
from wage changes and 25.3% comes from decreased life expectancy.
The last line of the table considers all changes together in an economy without
marital dynamics after age 25 and finds that the welfare loss of single men is higher
and that of single women lower when they have no expectations of getting married in
the future. When couples no longer divorce, their welfare loss is higher because the
wife works harder and no longer gets divorced.
8 Conclusions and directions for future research
Of the three changes that we consider, that is, wages, out-of-pocket medical ex-
penses during retirement, and life expectancy, we find that the observed changes in
the wage schedule had by far the largest effect on the labor supply of men and women
born in the 1960s cohort. Specifically, it depressed the labor supply of men and in-
creased that of women, especially in married couples. The decrease in life expectancy
mainly reduced retirement savings, while the expected increase in out-of-pocket med-
ical expenses increased them. On net, these two changes taken together had overall
modest effects on all of the outcomes that we consider, including savings.
We also find that the combined effect of the changes has large welfare costs. In fact,
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the onetime asset compensation required to make 25-year-old households indifferent
between the 1940s and 1960s health and survival dynamics, medical expenses, and
wages is $126,000 for single men, $44,000 for single women, and $132,000 for couples.
The corresponding numbers expressed as a fraction of their average present discounted
value of earnings are 12.5%, 7.2%, and 8.1%, respectively. Lower wages explain 47%-
58% of these losses, shorter life expectancies explain 26%-34%, and higher medical
expenses account for the rest.
Other interesting changes took place for the same cohorts, including in the number
of children, marriage and divorce patterns, assortative mating, child care costs, initial
conditions at age 25, and time spent in home production and raising children. Our
paper suggests that studying the opportunities and outcomes of people in different
cohorts and across different groups is a topic worthy of investigation, including from
a macroeconomic standpoint.
We focus on the population of white and non-college-educated Americans to bring
to bear a large and relatively homogeneous population to our structural model and
study its implications. However, white non-college-educated Americans are hardly the
only disadvantaged population losing ground over time in the United States. Neal
(2011) extensively documents that while black-white skill gaps diminished over most
of the 20th century, important measures of these gaps have not dropped since the
late 1980s. A significant literature also documents a dramatic decline in employment
rates and a lack of wage growth among less-skilled black men over the past four
decades or more (see Neal and Rick (2016) and Bayer and Charles (2018)). However,
this literature does not employ structural models that facilitate analyses of trends in
aggregate welfare or overall inequality.
While employment rates for less-skilled black and white men were falling, incarcer-
ation rates were rising. However, these rising incarceration rates did not reflect rising
levels of criminal activity. Neal and Rick (2014, 2016) show that the prison boom,
which began around 1980, was primarily the result of policy changes that increased
the severity of punishment for all types of criminal offenders. These changes more
than doubled the incarceration rates of young black and white men. As a result, a
much larger fraction of the current generation of less-educated Americans have spent
time in prison, and only the future can reveal the total impact of these prison expe-
riences on their lifetime earnings and consumption (Holzer, 2009). Thinking about
crime and related policies and their effects in the context of structural models is an
46
important extension to better understand the economic outcomes of disadvantaged
populations.
Fella and Gallipoli (2014) estimate a rich life cycle model with endogenous edu-
cation and crime choices to study the effects of two large-scale policy interventions
aimed at reducing crime by the same amount: subsidizing high school education and
increasing the length of prison sentences. They find that increases in high school
graduation rates entail large efficiency and welfare gains, which are absent if the
same crime reduction is achieved by increasing the length of sentences. Intuitively,
the efficiency gains of the subsidy come from its effect on the education composition
of the labor force. No such effect is present in the case of a longer prison term.
Another important observation is that low-income individuals are both more likely
to develop a severe work-limiting disability and more likely to apply for disability
insurance when they are not severely disabled. Low and Pistaferri (2015) find that by
age 60, the low educated are 2.5 times more likely to be disability insurance claimants
than the high educated (17% versus 7%). In addition, a large increase in disability
enrollment has been taking place over time, going from 2.2% in the late 1970s to
3.5% in the years immediately preceding the 2007-2009 recession and 4.4% in 2013
(Liebman, 2015). Michaud and Wiczer (2018) study the increase in disability claims
of men over time in the context of a structural model and evaluate the importance of
changing macroeconomic conditions in driving it. They find the secular deterioration
of economic conditions concentrated in populations with high health risks accounts
for a third of the increase in aggregate disability claims for men. These changes
occurred in conjunction with the rise in participation (and disability claiming) of
women. Gallipoli and Turner (2011) show that marriage interacts with health and
disability shocks in an important way and that single workers’ labor supply responses
to disability shocks are larger and more persistent than those of married workers.
Thus, enriching our framework to allow for health shocks during the working period
and disability insurance is an important area of research to better understand the
changing opportunities and outcomes of the most disadvantaged groups.
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